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Property Rights, Land Use and the Rural Environment: A Case for Reform 
 
Christopher Rodgers1 
 
Introduction 
 
English law confers extensive land use rights as an attribute of property ownership, 
sometimes articulated in the common law maxim cuius est solum eius est usque ad 
coelum et ad inferos (he who owns land owns everything reaching to the heavens and 
down to the centre of the earth) (see further Gray and Gray, 2005, 14ff). This 
principle is now so heavily qualified, especially in relation to exploitative rights, that 
it is virtually meaningless and certainly misleading. It is, however, emblematic of the 
fact that the common law does not itself recognise, as an attribute of property 
entitlements, any qualification of the owner’s property domain imposing obligations 
of environmental stewardship or trust.  Nevertheless, recent years have seen a major 
realignment of property rights and a growing recognition in public policy instruments 
that exploitative rights over land must incorporate stewardship obligations.  
 
There is, as yet, no unified or consistent approach to property rights reform. Instead, 
the common law model has been subjected to incremental reform by a number of 
different legal and policy instruments, some of general scope and application, and 
some of more limited scope. Many have been introduced since the UK’s accession to 
the European Community in 1972 and are derived from European Union 
environmental law, and from the law of the common agricultural policy. This paper 
will consider the impact of these developments on property rights theory, and will 
anticipate the further modifications to property concepts required by a land use policy 
increasingly focussed to the promotion of environmental stewardship.  It will make 
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the case for the introduction of a general duty of environmental stewardship as an 
attribute of property ownership in the law of England and Wales.  
 
Property rights paradigms and land use 
 
 “Property” is a mobile concept, capable of different interpretations that capture the 
different functions that property rights perform, and the differing facets of the 
relationship of the property holder with land. Two closely related, but different, 
property models are fundamental to an understanding of the relationship between 
property rights and land use:  
(i) an entitlements- based model that captures the role of property rules in 
defining the legitimacy ownership entitlements, and  
(ii)  a resource allocation model that focuses on the role of property rights in 
allocating and defining access to the resources that land represents.  
They are closely related, and reflect the differing functions that property rights 
perform - on the one hand in defining legally sanctioned rights to land and its 
produce, and on the other as an allocative tool for defining the access to the land 
resource that the entitlement confers. Neither are they mutually exclusive. A property 
entitlement rule will often also fulfil a resource allocation function – for example a 
leasehold entitlement will define the terms on which the tenant has access to the land 
resource, and allocate fewer resource rights to him than a freehold would . The 
landlord will commonly reserve minerals and game rights, thereby restricting the land 
resource available to the tenant for economic exploitation. A reallocation of resource 
entitlements can also be effected, however, by legal and economic instruments 
external  to the property entitlement rules defining the landholders interest in the land 
e.g. by environmental legislation restricting potentially damaging land uses, by “soft 
law” instruments such as codes of practice, and by economic instruments to 
encourage land management for nature conservation.       
 
Entitlement theories often see property as an abstract construct, characterised by the 
presence of “incidents” of ownership and of conceptually abstract “rights” which 
make up the essential indicia of ownership - for example the right to possession, to 
use, to manage, to income and capital, to security, the incident of transmissibility, 
absence of termination and liability to execution (Honore 1961, 107ff). Others see 
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property rights as primarily comprising items that are either the subject of direct 
trespassory protection by the law, or capable of separate assignment as parts of private 
wealth (for example Harris, 1996, 140-142). The focus here is on whether there is a 
legally protected right to the exploitation and use of land: whether that right is 
actually utilised (and if so in what manner) is of little relevance to an entitlements 
based analysis, and it therefore fails to encompass the functional relationship of 
property with the environment. Defining “property” in this way as constituent 
primarily of a “bundle of rights” is a characteristic of western liberal jurisprudence, 
which emphasises the power to exclude others and the right of the owner to the 
beneficial use and enjoyment of the land and personal property over which ownership 
is claimed (Raff, 1998; Penner, 1998). 
 
Resource allocation models of property rights stress that they represent the elements 
of resource utility that (taken together) make up a land interest. The bundle of 
property “rights” over land that the law recognises will define, distribute and reflect 
different elements of resource utility that accrue to the “owner” of the right in 
question (Gray and Gray, 1998, 39). This approach has greater potential for capturing 
the dynamic interrelationship between property and instruments of environmental 
governance. Whenever legislation alters the allocation of utility rights over land, then 
a transfer of “property” in this sense has occurred. Environmental legislation is 
fundamentally concerned with the limitation or redistribution of property rights in this 
sense – as elements of utility - in order to pursue a public policy objective in 
environmental protection. It also resonates with economic models for property that 
stress the dynamic nature of property rights (see Bromley 1991, Hodge 1991, Colby, 
1995).  These see the function of property rights as primarily to provide incentives to 
internalise the potential environmental externalities that have emerged from the 
growing technical potential of agricultural production to generate pollution and 
damage biodiversity (Demsetz 1967).  
 
Environmental Protection – Incremental Modification of Property Rights 
 
Applying a resource allocation property model, modern legislation can be seen to 
have effected an extensive reallocation of property rights in land, while leaving 
property entitlements largely intact. Three examples will be considered in this paper. 
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These illustrate the impact of a process of “salami slicing” which has resulted in the 
removal of elements of resource utility and a commensurate restriction of land use 
rights. And all three also demonstrate a gradual move towards a more extensive 
reallocation of property rights to the state in the period from 1945. The legal form 
which these measures have taken is important, as all have employed public law 
instruments to vary resource allocation rights, without impacting upon the core 
content of the common law model of property entitlements.  
 
- Environmental Law 
  
The principal measures on the protection of wildlife habitats in English Law are 
contained in Part 2 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 and the Conservation 
(Natural Habitats, & c.) Regulations 1994. The 1981 Act provides for the notification 
and protection of Sites of Special Scientific Interest (“SSSIs”) by the conservation 
bodies. There are currently over 4000 notified SSSIs in England covering 1074301 
hectares by area. The designation stratagem for protected habitats originated in the 
Huxley report (Huxley 1947) and the National Parks and Access to the Countryside 
Act 1949. The 1949 Act avoided any direct interference with property rights, and 
introduced a requirement for consultation with the Nature Conservancy Council on 
planning applications in designated areas.   
 
The Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 strengthened the environmental regulation of 
land use, but retained a protectionist philosophy focussed on preventing damage to 
SSSIs. The 1981 Act left property entitlements intact and assumed an absolute right to 
resource use and exploitation by landowners, even if it was environmentally 
damaging. Section 28 of the 1981 Act imposed restrictions on a landowner’s right to 
carry out operations in an SSSI where the site notification identified them as 
potentially damaging operations likely to damage the conservation interest of the site. 
Landowners were required to serve notice of their intention to carry out a potentially 
damaging operation, and to engage in a statutory consultation with the conservation 
body before carrying it out. The consultation period was initially limited to four 
months, during which it remained a criminal office to carry out notified operations, 
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but on its conclusion they could be lawfully carried out without redress2. The 
protection of the site would therefore depend upon the conservation body “buying 
out” the landowner’s property entitlement in a management agreement, or on the 
Secretary of State making a nature conservation order to protect the site (see Ball, 
1996; Rodgers 1998; Rodgers and Bishop 1998; Livingstone et al 1990).  Ministerial 
guidance provided for the payment of compensation under management agreements – 
either on the basis of a lump sum payment representing loss of land value or an annual 
payment representing the “profits foregone” by the landowner as a consequence of 
complying with the terms of the agreement (DoE 1983).  
 
The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 further strengthened the law by 
empowering the conservation bodies to indefinitely refuse operational consent to 
“operations likely to damage” the conservation interest of a site (hereafter “OLDs”), 
subject to a right of appeal to the Secretary of State (1981 Act, section 28E(3)(5), 
28F,as amended). It also introduced measures to require positive management of 
wildlife features by landowners. When notifying an SSSI, Natural England or the 
Countryside Council for Wales (hereafter “the conservation bodies”) must now serve 
a site management statement giving their views about the management of the land and 
the conservation and enhancement of its natural features, flora and/or fauna (1981 
Act, section 28(4) as amended). The statement will provide the operational context 
within which decisions will be made on applications for consent to carry out OLDs. If 
necessary, a management agreement can be offered in which the landowner trades 
property entitlements in order to protect the nature conservation interest in the SSSI. It 
is obligatory to do so in some cases – for example, where operational consent has 
been given by the conservation body, but is later withdrawn or amended (1981 Act, 
section 28M).  The conservation bodies were also given power to make management 
schemes for SSSIs and, if a scheme is not being adhered to by landowners, to serve 
management notices requiring positive land management to protect and enhance 
conservation features. The introduction of a power to make land management notices 
is a radical innovation with considerable implications for the reallocation of property 
rights to the state.  
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 This procedure was subjected to judicial criticism by the House of Lords in Southern Water Authority 
v Nature Conservancy Council [1992] 3 All. E.R. 481. Lord Mustill referred to the statutory 
consultation procedure as “toothless” ([1992] 3 All.E.R. 481 at 484 g). 
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Land use controls are more extensive in European sites that form part of the Natura 
2000 network designated under the Conservation (Natural Habitats, & c.) Regulations 
1994. As a matter of public policy all European sites in England and Wales are also 
notified as SSSIs under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. Although the legal 
controls in European sites are modelled on those in the 1981 Act, the conservation 
bodies have more limited power to grant operational consent for OLDs than applies if 
the site is simply an SSSI. They must carry out an environmental assessment of any 
proposal for operational consent and can only grant consent if satisfied that the 
proposed operations will not adversely affect the conservation status of the site 
(Conservation (Natural Habitats, & c.) Regulations 1994, reg. 20(1)(2)). They have 
power to make byelaws in European sites prohibiting the killing or disturbance of 
wildlife and prohibiting any interference with the vegetation, soil or other features of 
the site (ibid reg.28). They can also apply to the magistrate for a restoration order if an 
OLD has been carried out without their consent (ibid. reg.26).   
 
- Instruments within the common agricultural policy 
 
The legal principles underlying the single farm payment scheme and the rural 
development measures following the 2003 Common Agricultural Policy (“CAP”) 
reforms are also premised upon a reallocation of property rights. Environmental land 
management schemes that will attract incentive payments are governed by rules in the 
1999 and 2005 EC Rural Development Regulations. Direct support payments to 
farmers are, moreover, now subsumed within the Single payment scheme, 
“decoupled” from production and subject to “cross compliance” requirements making 
payment conditional upon the observance of basic land management prescriptions. 
Cross compliance consists of two elements: (i) the adherence to statutory management 
standards relating to public, animal and plant health, environmental protection and 
animal welfare requirements, including for example compliance with standards under 
EC environmental directives such as the 1992 Habitats and Species Directive, and (ii) 
a requirement to maintain land that is no longer in agricultural production in “good 
agricultural and environmental condition” (arts. 4 and 5, and Annex 111 of Council 
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Regulation 1782/2003). These have been implemented by statutory instrument3 in 
England and Wales, and require the observance of a number of basic land 
management requirements, including the completion of soil protection reviews and 
the avoidance of overgrazing and unsuitable supplementary feeding of livestock. 
 
In general terms cross compliance measures are targeted at protecting the rural 
environment, as it now exists, while the improvement or enhancement of farmland 
biodiversity is a matter for agri environment schemes introduced under the Rural 
Development Regulation (Dwyer, 2000; Cardwell, 2003, 246ff.). These can, like 
Entry Level Stewardship and Higher Level Stewardship in England, provide incentive 
payments for habitat improvement or habitat restoration. To qualify for environmental 
stewardship payments, however, farmers must meet conditions going beyond what is 
required by “good agricultural practice”. The legal order for the CAP is premised on 
the philosophy that they must observe basic environmental standards without 
compensation, but that environmental services going beyond this are purchased 
through the agri-environment schemes (CEC, 1999, para 3.2.1). The rural 
development measures therefore assume that landowners must bear environmental 
compliance costs up to a reference level of good agricultural practice reflected in 
property rights (Rodgers 2003; CEC 2000). The 2003 CAP reform applied the 
Polluter Pays principle of EC environmental law to the agriculture sector (see 
Cardwell, 2006). The incorporation of environmental management standards within 
property rights by the legal order for the CAP represents a fundamental move away 
from the philosophy of earlier UK legislation such as the Wildlife and Countryside 
Act 1981. It also complements the changes to the law of habitat protection in the 
Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 (above), and represents a further transfer of 
resource utility in land to the state. 
 
- Development Control 
 
                                                 
3
 See the Common Agricultural Policy Single Payment and Support Schemes (Cross Compliance) 
(England) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/3459 as amended, reg .4 and Schedule; Common Agricultural 
Policy Single Payment and Support Schemes (Cross Compliance)(Wales) Regulations 2004, SI 
2004/3280,reg.4 and  Schedule.  
. 
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The Town and Country Planning Act 1947 redistributed property rights by imposing 
public control of development rights in land. The impact of planning control has been 
more limited in a rural context than some of the measures discussed under 2.1 and 2.2 
above. Planning policy explicitly recognises property rights, and supports the right of 
consequences for the environment or the community would be unacceptable”. The 
focus of development control is on ensuring that consented development is not 
environmentally damaging (see PPS 1 para 17-20). The introduction of environmental 
impact assessment for potentially damaging infrastructure projects has been important 
in this regard.  
 
Special rules are applied in protected habitats such as SSSIs to ensure that the 
conservation interest is considered as a material factor in development control 
decisions. And stricter planning guidance for European wildlife sites imposes a 
presumption against the grant of development consent in Natura 2000 sites (PPS 9 
2005; regs. 48 and 49 Conservation (Natural Habitats & c.) Regulations 1994). These 
rules complement those discussed in 2.1 above (which apply for the control of land 
uses that do not involve “development”) and ensure that, where development does 
require planning permission in Natura 2000 sites such permission can only be given in 
very limited circumstances e.g. if there are imperative reasons of overriding public 
interest at stake and there are no alternative solutions to the proposed plan or project. 
But outside protected areas development control has a more limited role in rural land 
management. Agriculture is mostly outside the ambit of the planning system4. 
Resource entitlements remain largely unaffected by development control, and the 
choice of legal instruments to implement policies for sustainable land management 
reflects this. This explains why, for example, the use of management contracts and 
codes of practice have been favoured as mechanisms for modifying agricultural 
property rights.  
 
Nevertheless, there has been a gradual extension of planning control over rural land 
use in the last 20 years. This is reflected, for example, in new policy guidance 
stressing the importance of policies for sustainable land use in development plans in 
                                                 
4
 Sections 55(2) (e), (f) Town and Country Planning Act 1990. A wide variety of developments 
connected with agriculture are, furthermore, given automatic planning consent under the Town and 
Country Planning (Permitted General Development) Order 1995, Sch.2 Part 6 (S.I. 1995/418). 
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rural areas (PPS 7, 2004). It is also reflected in a tightening of the rules in the General 
Development Order for the exercise of permitted agricultural development rights e.g. 
the introduction in 1992 of local authority scrutiny of projects for the design and 
siting of farm buildings executed with permitted development rights. And in 2006 
environmental impact assessment was introduced for projects to restructure land 
holdings and convert semi natural land to intensive agricultural use. These measures 
all restrict the use of resource entitlements without prior regulatory approval, while 
leaving property entitlements intact.  
 
Common Property and Sustainable Management  
  
Common land in England and Wales displays unique qualities that illustrate the 
importance of the distinction between the property entitlement and resource allocation 
models of property rights.  Common land is privately owned, but subject to multiple 
land use rights for agricultural exploitation, recreation and environmental protection. 
The property entitlements of common right holders are expressed as incorporeal 
hereditaments, profits a prendre giving a right to take the produce of the land –  for 
example, pasturage (grazing rights), turbary (the right to take peat) and estovers (the 
right to take ferns or bracken for animal bedding). The rights will normally be 
appurtenant (attached to) a dominant tenement – typically a farm adjoining the 
common. Common rights were registered under the Commons Registration Act 1965, 
which imposed a static model for common property entitlements. The register will 
give a fixed number of grazing rights for each dominant tenement to which rights 
attach, and these represent its maximum grazing entitlement over the common. 
Transfers of rights and land subsequent to registration were not compulsorily 
registrable, however, and the commons registers are therefore often inaccurate and 
fail to record the contemporary ownership and use of common rights  
 
Common land is a significant land resource, totalling 369,394 hectares in England - 
399,040 hectares if common land that is exempt from registration (such as Epping 
Forest and the New Forest) is included (Pastoral Commoning Partnership, 2008, 26). 
A large proportion of the common land in England and Wales supports wildlife 
designations - in England 210,806 hectares, approximately 57% of the total area of 
common land, is in notified SSSIs and 48% in National Parks (ibid Tables 3.1, 3.2). 
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Natural England data suggests that only 19% of common land within SSSIs is 
currently in favourable condition: 48% is in unfavourable but recovering condition 
27% in unfavourable condition with no change and 6% in an unfavourable declining 
position (Natural England 2008, Figure 3.1). The poor condition of natural habitats on 
common land, relative to land of other tenure types, is clearly evidenced by the 
statistics: while only 19% of common land in SSSIs is in favourable condition, the 
overall condition of the habitats on 80% of the total area of the national SSSI network 
was assessed by Natural England as “favourable” in 2008 (ibid para 3.2.4.2).  
Improving the environmental management of protected habitats on common land is a 
key priority for the delivery of DEFRA’s public service agreement target to get 95% 
of SSSIs in England into favourable condition by 2010.  
 
The sustainable management of common land is problematic. The Commons Act 
2006 has introduced reforms to facilitate the self regulation of commons by 
stakeholders. Part 2 of the 2006 Act makes provision for the establishment of 
statutory commons councils which will have legally binding powers to manage 
commons. Their adoption is optional, and it is therefore likely that their size, nature 
and regional jurisdiction will vary. Stakeholders will have to demonstrate to the 
Secretary of State that there is “substantial support” for the establishment of a 
commons council - especially from persons having legal rights over the common (for 
instance the owner of the soil), commoners themselves, and others with legal 
functions which relate to the management and maintenance of common land 
(Commons Act 2006, section 27(4) (5)). Commons councils will be established by 
order and will have the legal status of corporate bodies (ibid section 26). 
 
The development of a flexible and dynamic re-conceptualisation of common property 
will depend upon commoners and other stakeholders using the 2006 Act to initiate 
self-regulation by commons councils. The Act provides that each commons council 
will have the power to introduce legally binding regulations to regulate agricultural 
activities, the management of vegetation and the exercise of common rights on the 
common (ibid section 31(3)(4)). They can also regulate the leasing or licensing of 
grazing rights, and will have power to remove animals illegally grazing the common 
and to remove unlawful boundaries and other encroachments (ibid section 31(3)(b)-
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(f)). These powers will be subject to confirmation in each case by the Secretary of 
State (ibid section 33). 
 
The commons councils will be able to establish “live” registers of common rights, so 
as to give an accurate picture of common entitlements, their current owners, and the 
manner in which they are being exercised. This would require the compulsory 
registration of all formal and informal transfers of grazing entitlements, and 
information from adjoining landowners as to numbers of livestock turned onto the 
common (ibid. section 31(3)(b)-(c)). Where this power is used, the living register will 
exist alongside, and separately from, the commons register originally established 
under the Commons Registration Act 1965, which will continue to record legal 
entitlements to exercise common rights. 
 
As a corporate body a commons council will be able to enter legal agreements and 
hold common property rights itself. At present this is normally impossible, as 
commoners associations are typically unincorporated associations with no corporate 
legal personality. This simple reform could make a major contribution to more 
flexible commons management. It is possible to create new rights of common under 
the 2006 Act (ibid section 6). In cases where a mixed grazing regime with cattle is 
required to improve the ecological management of a common, new common 
pasturage rights could be created and vested in the commons council. This would 
provide for more effective participatory management of the common by commoners, 
acting through the commons council, and also facilitate the common’s entry into agri-
environment schemes such as Higher Level Stewardship, where flexible ecological 
management is otherwise difficult to achieve on commons, where registered rights 
sometimes fail to reflect the desired grazing regime.  
 
The introduction of binding rules governing common grazing will also enable a 
commons council to bind inactive graziers and prevent them from exercising 
previously unused common rights. This will facilitate the speedier conclusion of 
environmental management schemes on common land. It will also remove the 
necessity to accommodate the property rights represented by registered (but unused) 
rights in environmental management agreements. Were a commons council to 
introduce agricultural management rules of this kind, some commoners would have 
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registered rights that they are unable to exercise. This will considerably reduced their 
economic value, although the “rights” themselves – being registered on the commons 
register – will subsist as legal property entitlements.  
 
The management powers conferred on commons councils highlight the importance of 
the distinction between property entitlement models, and more dynamic property 
rights models that stress their role as a mechanism for the allocation of land-based 
utility rights (for example Gray, 1994). Viewed through the prism of a property 
entitlement model, a commoner will retain a property right because his theoretical 
“right” (to graze, take peat, bracken etc.) will still be reflected in an entry in the 
commons register, even if he cannot exercise it.  
 
The resource allocation model of property rights produces a different perspective. The 
introduction of agricultural management rules that restrict or remove land use rights 
will abrogate commoners’ property rights. The fact that they retain registered rights is 
irrelevant insofar as those rights will have ceased to give access to a resource (e.g. the 
taking of grass by grazing). The commons register will have ceased to reflect the 
allocation of the agricultural resources to which registered rights notionally give 
access, and as it will no longer reflect the true distribution of land-based utility it 
cannot be said to accurately represent the allocation of property rights in the common. 
Likewise, a “bargaining” model of property rights would hold that, insofar as the 
rights no longer give access to resource utility they cannot be accommodated in an 
economic exchange, and cannot therefore be considered a species of property right. It 
follows that a property entitlement model is wholly inappropriate to describe the 
flexible nature of property relationships in common land, or to capture the more 
dynamic role of property rights in delivering environmental management envisaged 
by the Commons Act 2006.      
 
Natural England has sponsored pilot studies to establish “shadow commons councils” 
in three areas – Cumbria, Bodmin common (Cornwall) and Minchampton 
(Gloucestershire). The shadow Cumbria commons council offers an interesting model 
for the future development of self regulatory common management. The preferred 
option here is to establish a county-based statutory council, with council 
representation from common land units in different regional sub divisions of the 
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county. This would achieve economies of scale in setting up and managing a statutory 
council, while maintaining the principle of local control by user groups and 
commoners. If the pilots are successful and lead to the widespread adoption of 
statutory councils in the future, this will have the potential to radically improve the 
sustainable management of both upland and lowland commons. It will also have 
major implications for the adjustment of resource rights in the commons, and usher in 
a more flexible and dynamic regime for common property rights.   
 
Human Rights and Property Rights 
 
Environmental regulation that imposes substantial community-orientated constraints 
on land use raises the difficult question of when uncompensated land use regulation 
shades into confiscation.  To what extent can human rights law act as a barrier to 
further modifications of property rights by future environmental legislation? And to 
what extent should the cost of implementing public policy on environmental 
protection be borne by individual property owners whose land use rights have been 
restricted? The latter question concerns the question of who should bear the cost of 
environmental protection, and not about the desirability or statutory competence of 
environmental regulation (Joseph, 2003).The application of a resource allocation 
model of property rights clarifies a number of the issues that arise in “human” rights 
challenges to the environmental regulation of land use. The fundamental question is 
most cases is the extent to which the cost of implementing environmental policy 
should be funded by public resources, or by restricting the economic benefit that can 
be reaped from a resource (such as land) by its owner through the imposition of land 
use constraints - and thereby imposing on individual property owners the economic 
cost of environmental protection.  
 
Article 1 of the Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights guarantees the 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions, with the important caveat that the state has the 
right to enforce such laws as it deems necessary “to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties”. What is the necessary balance between the public interest 
in environmental protection on the one hand, and the individual property rights of the 
landowner on the other? In cases under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 the 
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courts’ stance was initially to adopt a position strongly supportive of private property 
rights (see Cameron v Nature Conservancy Council (1991); Thomas v Countryside 
Council for Wales (1994)). In several more recent cases brought under the Human 
Rights Act 1998 they have, however, adopted a strongly communitarian stance. The 
role of the human rights jurisprudence in this area is not to adjudicate on the 
allocation of resources reflected in environmental legislation such as the Wildlife and 
Countryside Act 1981, and reflected in the property rights of landowners in SSSIs and 
other protected sites. Rather, it is to ensure that the manner in which that allocation 
has been arrived at in individual cases reflects the procedural norms of distributive 
justice and /or protects essential social values reflected in the convention rights 
themselves. The principle of proportionality plays a key role in this regard in ensuring 
that the actions taken by the conservation bodies, both when notifying SSSIs and 
when subsequently exercising statutory powers over land management, are 
proportionate to the public interest in environmental protection that is being pursued 
in each case. 
 
The significance of the changes made by the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 
2000 for property rights in SSSIs has been explicitly recognised by the courts. In 
Aggregate Industries UK Ltd v English Nature (2003)  it was held that the 
confirmation of an SSSI notification by English Nature was itself determinative of the 
claimant’s civil rights to use and enjoy its property, and therefore engaged Article 1 of 
the Protocol. The legal effect of the notification was that the landowner was no longer 
able to use or cultivate its land as it saw fit, as it had formerly been able to do within 
the constraints of the law, because it now needed English Natures permission to carry 
out many activities for which it was not formerly required. Significantly, it has been 
accepted arguendo in later cases that the initial notification of a site as an SSSI also 
involves a clear determination of the owner’s civil rights (Boyd v English Nature, 
2003).  
 
The property rights implications of the statutory consultation provisions for 
potentially damaging operations in an SSSI were considered in Fisher v English 
Nature (2004). In Fisher it was held that issuing a list of OLDs was not itself a breach 
of article 1. All that the statutory mechanism requires is that a consultation be 
initiated, and that the consent of Natural England be obtained, before an operation is 
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carried out. If a landowner applies for operational consent then a fair balance can be 
struck in determining whether consent be granted in the particular case - the required 
balance being between the public interest in protecting the wildlife habitat for which 
the site was notified (a habitat for nesting stone curlews in the Fisher case) and the 
claimant’s interest in carrying out the operation. The legislative regime for managing 
SSSIs was held not to be disproportionate, principally because it includes a 
mechanism for achieving the required balance between the individual and collective 
interests (and thereby of course in the allocation of resources) in individual cases. In 
holding the regime to be convention-compliant the Court of Appeal placed 
considerable emphasis upon the fact that the landowner is free at all times to apply to 
be absolved from the bonds imposed upon him by the SSSI notification by applying 
for operational consent. The key to the regime’s compliance with the convention right 
appears to have been the facility for appeals against a refusal of operational consent to 
the Secretary of State (section 28P, 1981 Act).  
 
The Court of Appeal’s approach in Fisher strongly reinforced the legitimacy of the 
reallocation of property rights to the state by the 1981 Act, and the corresponding 
restriction in the resource utility rights of the landowner. Nevertheless, the application 
of land use controls in an SSSI must adhere to the proportionality principle if their 
exercise is to be legitimate, in the sense that Natural England’s actions must in each 
case be proportionate to the public policy interest that is being pursued. These issues 
were tested in Trailer and Marina (Leven) Ltd. v Secretary of State and English 
Nature (2004).   The applicants challenged the manner in which the revised 
Guidelines on Management Agreement Payments, introduced in 2001, applied to 
reduce the payments to which they were entitled for conservation management of 
SSSI land. Their principal objection was to the transitional provisions in the 2000 Act 
and the replacement of the formula under which compensation was payable on the 
basis of the net profits foregone if potentially damaging operations were not carried 
out.  
 
Where land was already designated an SSSI prior to the 2000 Act the notification 
provisions were (to use Lord Justice Neuberger’s phrase) largely “toothless”. It was 
argued in Trailer and Marina that the amendments in the 2000 Act - giving “teeth” to 
notifications already made under the 1981 Act - had resulted in an infringement of the 
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article 1 Protocol rights of the landowners. They argued that the combined effect of 
the new restrictions on land use in the 2000 Act and the revised Financial Guidelines 
was to render their property interest valueless. The Court of Appeal held, however, 
that the amended land use regime for SSSIs was not inherently incompatible with 
article 1, and did not amount to a disguised appropriation of ownership. Viewed as a 
case of land use control, and not expropriation, the relevant test was essentially 
subjective - provided the state could properly take the view that the benefit to the 
community outweighed detriment to the individual, a fair balance will be struck 
without the requirement to compensate the individual for the diminution in the value 
of his property rights in the land (judgement at para 26). In the light of the purpose of 
the legislation, and of the safeguards applied to protect landowners where operational 
consent for damaging operations was sought, they considered that the benefit to be 
enjoyed as a result of the amendments made by the 2000 Act, although achieved at the 
expense of the owners and occupiers of SSSIs, was such that there could not be said 
to have been an infringement of the convention rights of the latter.   
  
The courts have, in these decisions, indicate very clearly that they are willing 
to uphold uncompensated restrictions on property rights, and in so doing permit the 
allocation of the economic cost of implementing environmental protection measures 
to individual landowners – with a consequent  reallocation of the control of land-
based resources from the individual to the state. This is in marked contrast to the 
position obtaining, for instance, in the United States, where the courts have upheld a 
more individualist perspective on property rights and have refused to recognise any 
element of public obligation to avoid the environmental degradation of privately 
owned land (for example in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council 1992).   
 
Property Rights Reform and Future Land Use Policy 
 
The legal instruments introduced by modern environmental legislation, and by the 
Commons Act 2006, are focussed on altering the resource allocation represented by 
property rights – to modify access to, and use of, the land resource where this is 
necessary to pursue a public policy objective. They have not altered the fundamental 
paradigm for property entitlements.  A more radical approach is arguably required, 
combining reform of the basic constituents of property entitlement rules with ongoing 
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modification of property rights as tools of resource reallocation. A model for 
“environmental” property rights would modify those property entitlements that 
currently confer a right to undertake environmentally damaging land use, and 
incorporate an explicit recognition of a basic responsibility of environmental 
stewardship as an integral component of property entitlement rules at common law.  
 
What obligations would a duty of environmental stewardship impose, and how would 
they be determined?  The stewardship component of property entitlements could be 
based upon a model reflecting a “suitable for use” standard, not dissimilar to that 
already used in contaminated land sites, where the legal standard for cleanup is 
dependent upon the use for which land has development consent. Where land is 
registered for agricultural use on the Rural Land Register, therefore, the stewardship 
obligation should reflect the principles of sustainable agriculture incorporated in the 
principles of good agricultural practice and in the cross compliance requirements for 
the single payment scheme e.g. the obligation to maintain land in good agricultural 
and environmental condition.  The principles of good agricultural practice are 
currently subsumed in property rights, but are not clothed with legal enforceability 
outside the confines of a voluntary agri-environment agreement. Similarly, cross 
compliance will only impose enforceable land management obligations if a landowner 
is claiming the single farm payment. These mechanisms effect, therefore, a very 
limited reassignment of property rights. The reform suggested here would clothe these 
principles with wider legal enforceability and effect a permanent and broadly based 
reassignment of property rights targeted to underpinning future land use policy for 
environmental protection. If planning permission was sought for development, any 
conflicts between environmental and other land use policies would be resolved in the 
planning arena, as at present.  
 
The reform of property entitlement rules to incorporate a duty of environmental 
responsibility would have important consequences for the interrelationship of the 
property entitlement and resource allocation functions of property rights. The formal 
expression of property entitlement rules as integral to estates and interests in land 
gives them primacy over adjustments in property rights effected by economic 
instruments and by public law mechanisms. The property owner’s entitlement will 
have priority unless his rights are adjusted by statute, or he chooses to reassign them 
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in an economic exchange such as land management agreement. And the primacy 
granted to the owner’s property entitlement at common law will determine the 
payment of compensation for reassigning legally vested rights.  
 
It follows that the reassignment of property rights by a management agreement is 
temporary and only endures for the lifetime of the contract. Similarly, adjusting 
property rights through the application of cross compliance imposes a transient 
measure of environmental regulation. The management rights traded in return for 
direct support payments are automatically reassigned to the property owner on 
termination of the subsidy arrangement. Moreover, if the producer is willing to farm 
without subsidy the cross compliance technique is inapplicable. It can only be used to 
reassign private property rights if economic conditions are such that producers are 
dependent on subsidy for production, and are willing to trade elements of resource 
utility conferred by property entitlements in an interdependence arising from their 
participation in direct support arrangements within the CAP. The exposure of these 
mechanisms to fluctuations in the market for agricultural commodities may also 
increase the cost of the incentives necessary to encourage producers to join 
environmental management schemes.  
 
The delivery of a basic level of environmental management for the rural environment 
is a public policy objective that should not be dependent on market forces for its 
effectiveness. And improvements in environment resource management could be 
more effectively protected if cross compliance conditions applied irrespective of 
whether landowners claimed the single farm payment. The primacy of property 
entitlement rules also means that on termination of a management agreement the 
owner resource utility rights will revert to the status quo ante, without necessarily 
protecting any environmental “gain” secured at public expense by the agreement. 
Similarly, in a protected area (such as an SSSI or Natura 2000 site) land use rights, 
represented by notified OLDs, will be reassigned to Natural England or the 
Countryside Council for Wales. If the site is subsequently denotified, property rights 
will automatically be reallocated to the owner by operation of law and the status quo 
ante reinstated. There is currently no mechanism to prevent environmentally 
damaging land uses being reintroduced unless they constitute development requiring 
planning permission, and no means to protect environmental improvements provided 
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at public expense under management agreements in SSSIs (other than through the site 
notification mechanism itself). 
 
Modifying property entitlements to include a basic stewardship duty is unlikely to 
infringe the prohibition on uncompensated “takings” of property in article 1 of the 
Protocol to the European Convention. In SSSIs the restrictions on carrying out OLDS 
are currently uncompensated unless a management agreement is negotiated with 
Natural England. The stewardship obligation suggested here would be more limited 
than those currently applied in most SSSIs. It would support protected areas policy for 
SSSIs by ensuring a basic level of environmental management for the wider 
countryside, recognising the interdependence of protected ecosystems and the 
importance of ecosystem facilities for the migration, sustenance and genetic exchange 
of protected species.  
 
The legal order for agri-environment schemes under the common agricultural policy 
already assumes that standards of good agricultural practice are an integral element of 
property rights. This may be the case in some continental legal systems, but not in 
English law, where property entitlements are currently unqualified by duties of 
stewardship or good practice. The modification of property entitlements suggested 
above would remedy this. Furthermore, many of the statutory management standards 
applied through cross compliance are based on pre-existing legal obligations – for 
example as to the protection of hedgerows, avoiding overgrazing and compliance with 
land use restrictions in notified SSSIs5. The cross compliance mechanism supplies an 
additional enforcement tool (withdrawal of subsidy) to ensure regulatory compliance. 
Those that are not so based require a very basic level of management e.g. in the case 
of land not in agricultural production a requirement to keep it in good environmental 
and agricultural condition by grazing rank vegetation once every five years6.     
                                                 
5
 See the Common Agricultural Policy Single Payment and Support Schemes (Cross 
Compliance)(England) Regulations 2005 SI 2005/3459,  reg.4 and Schedule para 6 (overgrazing), para 
10 (protection of hedgerows), para 23 (observance of SSSI notifications);  Common Agricultural 
Policy Single Payment and Support Schemes (Cross Compliance)(Wales) Regulations 2004, SI 
2004/3280,reg.4 and  Schedule para 6 (overgrazing), paras 11 and 12 (protection of hedgerows), para 
21 (observance of SSSI notifications). 
6
 Common Agricultural Policy Single Payment and Support Schemes (Cross Compliance)(England) 
Regulations 2005 SI 2005/3459,  reg.4 and Schedule para 7; Common Agricultural Policy Single 
Payment and Support Schemes (Cross Compliance)(Wales) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/3280,reg.4 and  
Schedule para.7 
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The reform of property entitlements to recognise a stewardship responsibility would 
assist in delivering a stable and effective environmental policy for rural land use, 
while underpinning both agri-environmental initiatives and public policy for protected 
areas more effectively than the present property rights regime permits. It would effect 
a rebalancing of rights and interests away from the private benefit of the landowner 
and recognise the wider community interest in, and reliance upon, the sustainable 
management of land (see generally W. Lucy and C. Mitchell 1996). It would also 
underpin improvements in environmental management secured through publicly 
funded agri-environment schemes more effectively than the law at present allows. 
And, of course, the assumption of a level of good practice would provide a basis for 
evaluating incentive payments under management agreements more widely that at 
present, where the rules are limited to rural development payments and the single 
farm payment under the CAP. The property entitlements that could be traded in an 
economic exchange would be adjusted to reflect the new stewardship obligation 
implicit in property entitlements.  
 
This paper has made the case for the recognition of a responsibility of environmental 
stewardship as an inherent attribute of property entitlements in English Law. Clothing 
the new duty with enforceability as a legal control would raise further significant 
issues. Conferring “horizontal” enforceability on a duty of environmental 
stewardship, however formulated, would be relatively straightforward, and could be 
accomplished through changes to the administrative arrangements for the supervision 
of CAP support payments and the oversight of management in protected areas (such 
as SSSIs) by the conservation agencies. This would achieve many of the 
environmental policy goals outlined above. Imposing sanctions of a more direct 
nature, such as forfeiture of land for beach of the stewardship duty, would raise more 
difficult problems and engage significant procedural issues and human rights law. 
These would require further research once the case for the recognition of a duty of 
environmental stewardship has been accepted.  
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